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JURISDICTION 
The order granting summary judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and 
for Washington County, Utah ("District Court") was entered on November 4, 2010. The 
Notice of Appeal was filed December 2, 2010. The appeal was transferred to the Court 
of Appeals January 6, 2011. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Section 
78A-3-102(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court correctly awarded Defendants Scott Wilson 
("Wilson") and Jeremy Larkin ("Larkin") summary judgment against Plaintiffs Lynn 
Harding and Eileen Harding (the "Hardings") on all of the Hardings' claims and causes 
of action and whether the District Court properly concluded that the Hardings presented 
insufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause. 
Standard of Review for Summary Judgment: Summary judgment "shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c). Further, although all reasonable inferences are to be decided in favor of the 
non-moving party (see Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 187-188 (Utah 1987)), "(w]hen a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
1 
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that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); and see Treloggan v. 
Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). < 
Standard of Review for Proximate Cause: Summary judgment finding that 
Defendants were not the proximate cause of the Hardings' alleged damages is appropriate 
I 
if the Hardings failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Atlas Title Insurance 
Agency, Inc. ("Atlas"); Randy Kidman ("Kidman") and Dave White's "(White") (Atlas, 
Kidman and White collectively hereinafter "Title Defendants") failure to record the trust 
deed in second position on the Initial Property was the proximate cause of the Hardings' 
alleged damages or as to whether there was a sufficient break in the chain of events 
causing the Hardings' alleged damages. Proximate cause may be decided by the District 
Court as a matter of law on summary judgment 1) "when the facts are so clear that 
reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the application 
of a legal standard to the facts" or 2) "when the proximate cause of an injury is left to 
speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of law." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, < 
439 (Utah 1996); see also Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48. 
2. The Hardings did not appeal the District Court's Order granting summary 
judgment insomuch as the order pertained to the Hardings' claims for civil conspiracy 
against Defendants Wilson and Larkin. See Brief of Appellants, P. 4. Accordingly, the 
issue of civil conspiracy is not presently before this Court. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION. 
The Hardings originally brought this action against Defendant Pecan Ridge 
Partners, LLC ("Pecan Ridge") for breach of contract alleging that Pecan Ridge and 
Defendant Scott Nielson breached their contract with the Hardings for construction of a 
home. (R. 5). After Pecan Ridge failed to answer the Hardings' Complaint, Plaintiffs 
took default judgment against Pecan Ridge. Defendant Nielson was never served with 
the Complaint. (See the Hardings' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Jurisdiction on file with this Court, page 1). As part of their original action, the 
Hardings also brought a breach of contract claim against Atlas and a claim for breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing associated with those contracts. (R. 6). The 
Hardings later amended their Complaint to include the following claims and causes of 
action: breach of fiduciary duty action against Title Defendants; civil conspiracy against 
Title Defendants and Defendants Wilson and Larkin; negligence; and conversion. (R. 60-
62). 
The Hardings allege that Title Defendants are liable to the Hardings for Title 
Defendants' failure to timely record a second position Deed of Trust on an "Initial 
Property". The Hardings also allege that, through a civil conspiracy, all Defendants are 
liable for the failure to timely record the second position Deed of Trust on the Initial 
Property. (R. 7). However, the failure to timely record the trust deed was not a proximate 
cause of the Hardings' damages. The Hardings released their interest in the Initial 
3 
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Property and in an "Additional Property." The Hardings exchanged those interests for an 
interest in a "Final Property". The Hardings voluntarily accepted a secured interest in the 
Final Property and voluntarily released their secured interest in the Initial Property and 
Additional Property. Despite accepting the substitute interest in the Final Property, the 
4 
Hardings claim that Title Defendants' failure to timely record the second position Deed 
of Trust on the Initial Property caused them damage when a first position interest holder 
foreclosed on the Final Property, extinguishing the Hardings5 second position Deed of 
Trust on the Final Property. (R. 4 ^ 35). 
The Hardings filed their Complaint on May 11, 2009. (R. 1). The District Court 
entered a Default Judgment against Pecan Ridge on July 13, 2010. (R. 39, 104). The 
Hardings filed an Amended Complaint on January 29, 2010 which included additional 
parties as set forth above and included additional causes of action (R. 54). 
On July 15, 2010, Title Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
requesting summary judgment as to the issue of proximate cause on all of the Hardings' ^ 
claims. Concurrently therewith Title Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
regarding the Hardings' conspiracy claims. (R. I l l , 125). Defendants Wilson and 
Larkin filed a Joinder Motion to Title Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
Hardings' conspiracy claims. (R. 347). 
On October 19, 2010, the District Court heard oral argument on the matter at 
which hearing the Hardings were represented by Samuel G. Draper, Esq.; Title 
Defendants were represented by Bryan J. Pattison, Esq.; and Defendants Wilson and 
i 
Larkin were represented by Stephen R. Schwendiman, Esq. (R. 468). At the hearing, the 
4 
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District Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims 
for civil conspiracy and granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of proximate cause for all other claims and causes of action asserted by the Hardings 
against any of the participating parties. (R. 456-457). 
On October 29, 2010, the District Court issued an order reflecting its ruling and 
granting summary judgment against the Hardings and effectively dismissing the 
Hardings' claims against Defendants ("Summary Judgment Order"). (R. 456-457). The 
Court set forth the following in its Summary Judgment Order: 
a. That there was not a genuine issue as to any material fact which 
precluded the entry of summary judgment and, therefore, summary judgment was 
appropriate as a matter of law; 
b. That the Hardings could not meet their burden of proof on causation 
because, from the facts and evidence presented, such determination would 
necessitate impermissible speculation. 
c. That summary judgment was granted against the Hardings as to their 
claim for civil conspiracy. 
d. That summary judgment was granted as to all claims against Title 
Defendants and Defendants Wilson and Larkin. 
(R. 456-457). 
The Summary Judgment Order was entered on November 4, 2010, and the 
Hardings appealed the District Court's Summary Judgment Order on December 2, 2010. 
5 
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4 
(R. 480-481). The Hardings have not appealed the District Court's ruling on summary 
judgment as to the Hardings' claims for civil conspiracy. See Brief of Appellants, P. 4. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts found in the brief of Title Defendants ("Atlas Brief), 
4 
Defendants Wilson and Larkin set forth the following facts: 
1. This litigation involves a failed residential development in Washington 
County known as The Communities at Pecan Ridge, which was to be developed by Pecan 
Ridge. (R. 157, 160). 
2. To begin the development, Pecan Ridge acquired property. (R. 193, 195). 
3. One property Pecan Ridge acquired was owned by the Hardings (the 
"Initial Property"). (R. 193). 
4. In December 2006, the Hardings sold and conveyed the Initial Property to 
Pecan Ridge for $1,150,000.00. (R. 193, 197) 
5. The Hardings seller-financed a portion of the Initial Property's purchase 
price, and received a trust deed note from Pecan Ridge for $800,633.11 ("Note"). (R. 
197,201). 
i 
6. The Note was to be secured by a second position trust deed recorded 
against the Initial Property ("Initial Trust Deed"). The parties used Atlas for the closing. 
(R. un-numbered page between 202 and 203, 203-204, 208 Req. No. 70). < 
7. A first position trust deed on the Initial Property was recorded in favor of a 
group of investors who collectively provided additional funding to Pecan Ridge. (R. 212, 
214-216) 
6 
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8. Although the Hardings' trust deed on the Initial Property was to be 
recorded in second lien position after the investors' trust deed, the Hardings' trust deed 
was not immediately recorded by Atlas, and Atlas recorded two other deeds of trust in 
front of the Hardings' trust deed. (R. un-numbered page between 202 and 203, 203-204, 
209, Int. No. 13). 
9. The beneficiaries of these trust deeds were REV Investments 1 and Solaris 
International, LLC. (R. 218-220, 222-225). 
10. In August or September 2007, the Hardings and/or Atlas discovered that the 
Hardings' trust deed had not been recorded in second position as planned. After this 
discovery, Atlas recorded the Hardings' trust deed. (R. un-numbered page between 202 
and 203, 203-204, 207, Req. No. 65) 
11. With the cooperation of the Hardings, Pecan Ridge acquired an additional 
parcel of property (the "Additional Property"). (R. 229-231, Int. No. 3) 
12. The Hardings also took a security interest against the Additional Property 
via trust deed securing $750,000.00 ("Additional Trust Deed"). (R. 243-245) 
13. The Additional Trust Deed was in second position on the Additional 
Property also behind a trust deed in favor of REV Investments 1 and Solaris 
International, LLC. (R. 247-249) 
14. Ultimately, the Additional Property was packaged with the Initial Property 
by the parties for a land exchange deal with the Ash Creek Special Service District ("Ash 
Creek"). (R. 229-231) 
7 
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4 
15. To facilitate the land exchange, Pecan Ridge obtained reconveyances of the 
trust deeds recorded against the Initial Property and the Additional Property, including a 
reconveyance of the Hardings' trust deeds. (R. 229-231; 251-256). 
16. Through the land exchange with Ash Creek, Pecan Ridge acquired a new 
4 
piece of property (the "Final Property"). (R. 229-231, 258-259). 
17. The Hardings' loans to Defendant Pecan Ridge were secured by a trust 
deed securing the amount of $1,550,633.10 ("Final Trust Deed"). (R. 261-264) 
18. Pursuant to agreement between the Hardings and Defendant Pecan Ridge, 
the Final Trust Deed was recorded in second position on the Final Property. (Compare R. 
266-270 with R. 261-264). 
19. As part of the land exchange transaction, the Hardings signed Lender's 
Closing Instructions to Atlas stating: "Lynn and Eileen Harding also understand that 
upon recordation of the new Trust Deed for the property described in 'Exhibit B-l ' the 
new recorded Trust Deed [Final Trust Deed] will be in second lien position on the [the 
Final Property]."' (R. 275). 
20. The Hardings' trust deed on the Final Property was in second position 
behind the trust deed of a group of investors as agreed. (R. 266-270). 
21. Pecan Ridge ultimately defaulted on the loan secured by the investors' first-
position trust deed against the Final Property. (R. 297-299). < 
22. In March 2009, the investors holding the first-position trust deed on the 
Final Property foreclosed on their trust-deed interest. (R. 313-317). 
8 
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23. Defendant Wilson was a member and owner of a business entity which was 
an investor, member, manager and principal of Pecan Ridge. (R. 356-357). 
24. Defendant Larkin was a member and owner of a business entity which was 
formerly an investor member, manager and principal of Pecan Ridge but who sold its 
interest in Pecan Ridge in October 2007. (R. 359-360). 
III. RESPONSE TO THE HARDINGS' DISPUTED FACTS 
The Hardings' brief states that they presented evidentiary support to the District 
Court that raised genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome summary 
judgment. However, the facts disputed in the Hardings' brief have no impact on whether 
this Court should reverse summary judgment in favor of Defendants Wilson and Larkin. 
If the Hardings' voluntary exchange of an interest in the Initial Property and second-
position interest in the Additional Property with a second-position interest in the Final 
Property sufficiently breaks the chain of causation and/or leaves the Hardings' claims 
sufficiently to speculation as the District Court found, then the facts the Hardings dispute 
make no difference to the outcome of this case. 
A. Fact #6 
The Hardings dispute the following fact: 
The Hardings' trust deed note was to be secured by a trust deed 
recorded against the Initial Property. The Hardings did not provide 
Atlas Title with written recording instructions regarding the 
recording of the trust deed against the Initial Property. 
The Hardings dispute this statement by setting forth factual allegations showing 
that the Hardings did provide Title Defendants with recording instructions. However, 
9 
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i 
whether recording instructions were provided is irrelevant to the issue of whether the 
failure to timely record the Initial Trust Deed was the proximate cause of damages to the 
Hardings. 
B. Fact #8 
4 
The Hardings dispute the following fact: 
The Hardings trust deed was to be recorded after the Goodman et al. 
trust deed, in second lien position on the Initial Property, but -
through inadvertence - it was not immediately recorded by Atlas 
Title. 
The Hardings dispute this statement by setting forth factual allegations showing 
that Title Defendants' failure may not have been the result of "inadvertence." However, 
whether Title Defendants' failure was the result of inadvertence is irrelevant to whether 
Title Defendants' failure to timely record was the proximate cause of any damages to the 
Hardings. The District Court found no causal connection with the failure to record, 
regardless of whether that failure was negligent, inadvertent or even intentional. 
C. Fact #10 
The Hardings dispute the following fact: 
Sometime in August or September 2007, the Hardings brought it to 
Atlas Title's attention that their trust deed was not recorded. After 
confirming this, Atlas Title immediately recorded the trust deed. 
The Hardings dispute this statement by setting forth factual allegations showing 
that, when Title Defendants realized that the Initial Trust Deed was not recorded, Title 
Defendants did not "immediately" record the Initial Trust Deed. Whether Title 
Defendants immediately recorded the Initial Trust Deed after discovery of their error or 
10 
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whether they waited days or even weeks is irrelevant to whether the failure to timely 
record the Initial Trust Deed was the proximate cause of damages to the Hardings. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants Wilson and Larkin hereby adopt the arguments set forth in the Atlas 
Brief, and Defendants Wilson and Larkin hereby set forth the following additional 
arguments: 
1. The Hardings failed to present any evidence to the District Court showing 
that Defendants Wilson or Larkin participated in any wrongdoing or that these 
Defendants breached any obligation to the Hardings. Further, the Hardings' only claim 
that connected Defendants Wilson and Larkin to possible liability was the Hardings' 
cause of action for civil conspiracy. Because there is no evidence showing any 
wrongdoing on the part of Defendants Wilson and Larkin individually and because the 
Hardings are not appealing the District Court's order granting summary judgment as it 
pertains to the Hardings' conspiracy claims, summary judgment should be affirmed in 
favor of Defendants Wilson and Larkin as to all of the Hardings' claims. 
2. The alleged failure of Title Defendants to timely record the Initial Trust 
Deed, and any actions of Defendant Wilson and/or Defendant Larkin that could be 
attributed thereto, were not the proximate cause of the Hardings' damages. Although the 
facts presented to the District Court show that Atlas failed to timely record the Initial 
Trust Deed on the Initial Property, this failure had no legally recognizable impact on the 
Hardings and was not the proximate cause of the Hardings' damages, as Plaintiffs were 
put in the agreed-to second position on the Final Property. The Court should not allow 
11 
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1 
the Hardings to create an issue of fact on causation where no issue exists based on the 
Hardings' speculation, and the Court should affirm the District Court's decision granting | 
summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The District Court properly entered summary judgment against the Hardings. In 
opposition to summary judgment, the Hardings were unable to set forth evidence and/or 
disputed material facts necessary to overcome summary judgment on the issue of 
proximate cause. The Hardings argued to the District Court that Defendants Wilson and 
Larkin were personally liable for the alleged damages suffered by the Hardings as a result 
of Title Defendants' failure to timely record the Hardings' Initial Trust Deed on the 
Initial Property. However, the Hardings failed to provide evidence that Defendants 
Wilson and/or Larkin personally engaged in wrongdoing which was the proximate cause 
of damage to Plaintiffs or that Title Defendants' failure to timely record the Initial Trust 
Deed was the proximate cause of damage. Accordingly, this Court should uphold the 
District Court's decision as it pertains to Defendants Wilson and Larkin. 
II. THE HARDINGS DID NOT RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT. 
A. The Hardings do not contest the District Court's Summary Judgment 
Order relating to the Hardings' claims for civil conspiracy. 
At the Summary Judgment hearing, Plaintiffs admitted that it was difficult for 
them to show a conspiracy, and Plaintiffs represented and admitted that they lacked 
evidence showing a conspiracy. (R. 468, P. 16). Further, the Hardings' brief states that 
12 
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they are "[n]ot disputing the dismissal of the conspiracy claim, and only seek a review of 
the proximate cause ruling." See Brief of Appellants, P. 4. The Hardings' claim for civil 
conspiracy was the only theory linking Defendants Wilson and Larkin personally to any 
liability in this matter. The Hardings did not make any other allegations and did not 
present any other evidence showing that Defendants Wilson and Larkin personally did 
anything intentionally and/or negligently causing Title Defendants' failure to timely 
record the Initial Trust Deed. Accordingly, without a civil conspiracy claim, Defendants 
Wilson and Larkin cannot be liable for the Hardings' damages, and the District Court 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants Wilson and Larkin. 
B. The Hardings did not present facts indicating any other personal 
wrongdoing on the part of Wilson and/or Larkin. 
The Hardings' opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment did not 
set forth any other recognizable claim or cause of action against Defendants Wilson 
and/or Larkin. The causes of action set forth in the Hardings' Complaint are the 
following: 1) breach of contract; 2) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 
3) breach of fiduciary duty; 4) negligence; 5) civil conspiracy; and 6) conversion, which 
causes of action the Hardings allege arose as a result of Title Defendants' failure to 
timely record the Initial Trust Deed in second position on the Initial Property. The record 
in this case is void of any allegation against Defendants Wilson and/or Larkin which 
would indicate that either of them personally and/or individually engaged in any conduct 
meeting the elements of these causes of action. 
13 
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Although the standard for summary judgment is a strict standard, the standard 
does not allow the Hardings' a "free pass" to trial and does not give the trial court free 
reign to create evidence where none exists. See Mountain West Surgical Center, L.L.C. 
v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 2007 UT 92, P10 (the summary judgment standard does not 
4 
allow the court to assume facts for which no evidence is offered). Without any facts or 
evidence implicating Defendants' Wilson and/or Larkin, the District Court's Summary 
Judgment Order should stand. 
Further, the Hardings cannot oppose summary judgment with speculation. The 
Hardings argued to the District Court that the reason they agreed to exchange the Initial 
Trust Deed and Additional Trust Deed with the Final Trust Deed was because the 
Hardings' security interest in the Initial Property had been damaged, forcing them to 
make the best of a lost situation. (R. 468 p. 16). The Hardings cannot rely on financial 
hindsight to argue that they could have acted differently when they voluntarily took 
affirmative action, without protest (even receiving compensation for that action (R. 468 
p. 20)) which action made the alternative impossible. Such speculation is not sufficient 
to overcome a motion for summary judgment. 
III. THE HARDINGS FAILED TO SHOW A CAUSAL LINK TO DAMAGES. 
A. Title Defendants' failure to timely record the Deed of Trust on the 
Initial Property is not the proximate cause of the Hardings' damages. 
The Hardings cannot show a causal connection between Defendant Wilson and 
Larkin's actions and/or their failure to act and any damages. As stated above, in addition 
to civil conspiracy, the causes of action set forth in the Hardings' Complaint include 
14 
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breach of contract; breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of 
fiduciary duty; negligence; civil conspiracy; and conversion. An essential element of 
each of these causes of action is proximate cause. Accordingly, if Title Defendants' 
failure to timely record the Initial Trust Deed in second position on the Initial Property 
was not the cause of damage, none of the causes of action can provide the Hardings with 
a recovery. 
Proximate cause is 'that cause which, in the natural and continuous 
sequence (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the 
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is 
the efficient cause - the one that necessarily sets in operation the 
factors that accomplish the injury. 
See HarHne, 912 P.2d at 439 (quoting Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 
245-46 (Utah 1985). In this case, Title Defendants' failure to timely record the Initial 
Trust Deed is irrelevant. Ultimately, the Hardings exchanged their trust-deed interest in 
the Initial Property and Additional Property with an interest in the Final Property through 
a land exchange. Once the Hardings were provided with, and voluntarily accepted, the 
Additional Trust Deed in second position on the Additional Property and once the 
Hardings' voluntarily participated in the land exchange for the Final Property, the chain 
of causation necessary to establish proximate cause was broken. 
The Hardings cannot causally link Title Defendants actions and the Hardings' 
unknown (and unascertainable) damages with the artificial chains of speculation. 
"[Wjhere the proximate cause of the injury is left to conjecture, the plaintiff must fail as a 
matter of law." See Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, P21 (quoting Sumsion v. Streator-
Smith, Inc.. 132 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 1943). What would have occurred if the Hardings 
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had not voluntarily accepted a second position deed of trust on the Additional Property or 
Final Property is speculation. An opposition to summary judgment should be based on 
actual facts (i.e. what actually happened), not on speculation (i.e. what could have 
happened). 
Further, proximate cause not only looks at what the complaining party would have 
done, but must also contemplate what all of the parties would have done. "Where there 
are probabilities the other way equally or more potent the deductions are mere guesses 
and the jury should not be permitted to speculate." See Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at P28; 
see also Zion Factory Stores Holding v. Lawrence, 2005 UT App. 361, P7 (finding that 
the Court could not say what actions the parties would have taken had the Plaintiff been 
notified of the actual circumstances and that it was speculation to say whether either of 
the parties would have or would not have conducted matters in their own self-interests). 
In this case, it is impossible to speculate as to how each of the parties would have 
conducted themselves had the Hardings not voluntarily agreed to move their interests to 
the Final Property. The possibilities are endless, and any evidence that a certain 
possibility would have prevailed is nonexistent. Accordingly, the District Court correctly 
found that the Hardings could not overcome summary judgment. 
B. A finding that the Hardings were damaged requires impermissible 
speculation. 
Even if the Hardings had shown the District Court some evidence of wrongdoing 
on the part of Defendants Wilson and Larkin, whether the Hardings suffered any damages 
at all, requires speculation. The Hardings would be entitled to damages only if they had 
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shown the District Court that they would have received a return on the Initial Property. 
Such a showing is impossible since the land swap occurred and all of the Hardings' 
interests were moved to the Final Property. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a 
jury is not free to find 
...a causal connection between a breach and some subsequent injury 
by relying on unsupported speculation.... Where there are 
probabilities the other way equally more potent the deductions are 
mere guesses and the jury should not be permitted to speculate. 
See Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at P21. The speculative nature of the damages becomes 
even more problematic when the logical end of the Hardings' argument is pursued. If the 
Hardings' were damaged, no court could possible quantify those damages. To quantify 
the damages, the Court would not only be required to speculate from the almost 
numberless possibilities as to what the Hardings would have done, but the Court would 
also have to speculate from numberless possibilities as to what the result of those actions 
would have been. 
Further, even if the Hardings would not have transferred their trust deed interest 
from the Initial Property and Additional Property to the Final Property and even if Atlas 
had properly recorded the Hardings' trust deed in second position on the Initial Property, 
the Hardings would have been in second position on the Initial Property behind the first 
position trust deed of other investors, and the Hardings' interest in the Initial Property 
would have been lost when the investors foreclosed on the Initial Property. 
Unfortunately, the destination of the Hardings' investment was the same regardless which 
path the parties took to get there. Accordingly, the District Court acted properly when it 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
did not allow the Hardings to use a mistake in the process of recording to provide them 
with an opportunity to seek speculative and punitive damages. 
C. The Hardings presented no evidence or facts to the District Court 
showing that Defendants Wilson and/or Larkin's actions were the 
proximate cause of their alleged damages. 
Even if the Court finds that summary judgment was not appropriate as to Title 
Defendants on the issue of proximate cause, summary judgment should be affirmed as to 
Defendants Wilson and Larkin because Defendants Wilson and Larkin were not 
individually or personally the proximate cause of damage to the Hardings. The Hardings' 
brief continually argues that the cause of the Hardings' damages was Title Defendants' 
failure to record the Initial Deed of Trust in second position on the Initial Property. The 
Hardings have the "burden to show that [Defendants Wilson and Larkin's] conduct was a 
substantial causative factor that led" to the Hardings' alleged damages. Mitchell v. 
Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985). The Hardings have not met this 
required burden. There are no allegations that Defendants Wilson or Larkin had anything 
to do with the untimely recording, and the Hardings attribute the failure to properly 
record only to Title Defendants. Where there are no actions of Defendants Wilson and 
Larkin in failing to record the interest on the Initial Property, Defendants Wilson and 
Larkin cannot be the proximate cause of the Hardings' damages. 
D. The case law presented by the Hardings does not support a reversal of 
the District Court, 
The case law cited by the Hardings, although extensive, does not support a 
reversal of the District Court's Summary Judgment decision. Each of the cases cited by 
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the Hardings is either distinguishable from this case or actually supports the District 
Court's ruling. The following is a brief analysis of the applicability of the more notable 
cases used by the Hardings to support their appeal. 
1. Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) was a case 
where the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a hotel owner failed to provide 
suitable security measures to prevent a murder. The court in that case concluded that 
attributing the alleged negligence of the hotel owner as the proximate cause of the death 
involved complete speculation and, therefore, the claims failed as a matter of law. Id at 
246. The case presently before this Court is similar to Mitchell in that the Hardings' case 
is based on speculation. Because the Hardings were given, and agreed to take, a second 
position interest in the Additional Property and then exchanged those interests for an 
interest in the Final Property, it is impossible to conclude what might have occurred if the 
Hardings kept their interest in the Initial Property. 
2. Godeskv v. Provo City, 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984) was a personal injury 
case where the Utah Supreme Court considered whether superseding acts broke the chain 
of causation in the defendant's negligence. The court stated the following: 
The earlier actor is charged with the foreseeable negligent acts of 
others. Therefore, if the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the 
earlier negligent act is a concurring cause....The proper test is 
whether the subsequent negligence was foreseeable by the earlier 
actor. 
See Id. at 545. In the present case, the Hardings took part in an intentional act that was 
meant to and did in fact break the chain of causation when they transferred their interest 
to the Final Trust Deed (i.e. the exchange of their lien interest in the Initial Property to 
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the Additional Property and then to the Final Property). The Hardings even represented 
that they received compensation for this exchange. (R. 468 p. 20). Accordingly, the 
Hardings own intentional act should be sufficient to break the chain of causation. 
3. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) was a 
traffic accident case where the vehicle plaintiff was traveling in crashed into the 
defendant's parked trailer. After citing the standard for proximate cause, the Utah Court 
of Appeals found that the negligence of the driver driving the plaintiffs vehicle was a 
sufficient intervening cause to break the chain of causation in relation negligence of 
defendant parking his trailer on the side of the road. See Id. at 45. If the negligence in 
that case is a sufficient intervening cause, then, the Hardings' voluntary and intentional 
actions to take a trust-deed interest in the Final Property should also be a sufficient 
intervening cause. 
4. In Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) a store customer was injured when employees chased a shoplifter from the store. 
Although the Utah Court of Appeals found that only in "rare" cases may a court properly 
take the issue of proximate cause from the jury, the court also found such appropriate 
when "(1) there is no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation to 
jury speculation, or (2) where reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences to be 
derived from the evidence on proximate causation." See Id. at 487. The Court of Appeals 
in that case found that the causal relationship between the alleged act and the alleged 
damage was too speculative. Id. at 490. The present case fits neatly into both ends of 
the spectrum set forth in Steffensen. First, as stated above, a jury would be forced to 
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engage in impermissible speculation as a result of the Hardings accepting a substitute 
deed of trust. Second, the facts in this case are such that reasonable persons could not 
differ in their conclusion that Title Defendants' failure to timely record the Initial Trust 
Deed was not the proximate cause of damages. 
5. In Thurston v. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 2003 UT App 438 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated the following: "Demonstrating material issues of fact 
with respect to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment if 
there is no evidence that establishes a direct causal connection between that alleged 
negligence and the injury." Id. at PI6. In the present case, the Hardings are attempting 
to show that summary judgment should be overturned because they may have raised an 
issue of fact as to whether Title Defendants breached a duty owed to the Hardings. 
However, simply providing evidence of a breach is not sufficient to overcome summary 
judgment on the issue of proximate cause - evidence that provides the causal link is 
required. 
6. Although the Supreme Court in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 
(Utah 1987) found that summary judgment is not appropriate in negligence cases when 
the case is not "clear-cut", the court also recognized that summary judgment is 
appropriate on occasion in negligence cases. In Ingram, as a result of the city's non-
delegable duty, there seemed to be no question as to the actual cause of a personal injury. 
In the present case, the Hardings' claim still involves a question as to the actual cause of 
damages. Further, the Hardings' claims do not involve a non-delegable duty. 
Accordingly, the present case differs from Ingram. 
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7. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) was a legal 
malpractice action. In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals stated that "causation or the 
connection between fault and damages in legal malpractice actions cannot properly be 
based on speculation or conjecture." Id. at 1291. The court further stated that "[t]o 
establish causation, plaintiffs must persuade a fact finder that their injury was a natural 
result of the defendant's breach." Id. at 1292. As previously stated, the Hardings' 
alleged damages were not the natural result of any breach and whether Title Defendants' 
actions were a cause of those alleged damages can only be determined through 
speculation. 
8. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1997) was a medical malpractice 
case. The Utah Supreme Court considered whether expert testimony could overcome 
summary judgment when the testimony was based on factually unsupported conclusions. 
The court found that affidavits must contain actual facts to overcome summary judgment. 
See Id. In the present case there are no evidentiary facts linking Defendants Wilson and 
Larkin's actions to any alleged damages. 
9. Lastly Cruz v. Middlekauff, 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996) was a case where a 
traffic accident became the by-product of a police chase. A thief was able to steal a car 
involved in the accident because the dealership selling the car left the key in the car. The 
plaintiff in that case sued the car dealership. The Utah Supreme Court stated the 
following: "An intervening, independent, and efficient cause ordinarily severs whatever 
connection there may be between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injuries, 
unless the intervening cause was foreseeable." Id. at 1257. Although the court found that 
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the thief s actions were foreseeable, the Supreme Court distinguished that Cruz, was not a 
typical case of intervening cause. The Hardings' case differs from Cruz in that in the 
present case, the Hardings' own acts that broke the chain of causation were intentional 
and voluntary acts. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly granted Defendants Wilson and Larkin summary 
judgment because Plaintiffs asserted no facts or evidence supporting a contrary finding. 
As stated above, the only cause of action in this matter directly related to Defendants 
Wilson and Larkin was the Hardings' claim for civil conspiracy, which issue is not before 
this Court on appeal. The Hardings' Complaint makes no allegations that Defendants 
Wilson and/or Larkin personally had a contract with the Hardings and no allegations that 
Defendants Wilson and/or Larkin personally breached a fiduciary duty and/or acted 
negligently. Plaintiffs' claims all revolve around Title Defendants' failure to timely 
record Plaintiffs' trust deed on the Initial Property and mention nothing of acts 
Defendants Wilson and Larkin performed or failed to perform. As shown above, even if 
the Hardings' allegations could be construed to include Defendants Wilson and Larkin, 
the District Court properly found no causal connection between Defendants' actions and 
the alleged damages. 
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« 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's Summary Judgment 
Order, which grants Title Defendants and Defendants Wilson and Larkin summary 
judgment as to all claims and causes of action of the Hardings. 
DATED this 3 ? day of December, 2011. 
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